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MAKING PUBLIC POLICY: A HOPEFUL VIEW OF AMERICAN GOVERN-
MENT, by Steven Kelman, Basic Books, N. Y., 1987.
Oliver North seems to be Steven Kelman's ideal public official.
He uses his own initiative to carry out policies in which he passion-
ately believes. He is not hampered by standard operating proce-
dures or the need to clear his plans with a range of functionaries in
various departments. He is flexible, creative, and hardworking in
carrying out his view of the public welfare. After his downfall he
quotes the beatitudes: "Blessed are those who are persecuted for
righteousness' sake for they shall see God."
But in spite of all his admirable character traits, North is surely a
counterexample for Kelman's claim that "when people try to
achieve good public policy, the result tends to be good public pol-
icy."' North's behavior raises in dramatic form the tension between
encouraging officials to carry out their view of the public interest
and ensuring accountability to voters and organized political inter-
ests. Such accountability may imply taking action based on paro-
chial interests. In contrast, Kelman believes that legislators,
bureaucrats, judges, and the President are, and should be, imbued
with the "public spirit." However, he is not very explicit about how
conflicts over values should be resolved, beyond an appeal to the
importance of "discussion and deliberation." 2 When do provisions
for deliberation become just so much more red tape that stifles initi-
ative and when do they promote high quality results?
In spite of such unresolved tensions in his analysis, Kelman has
written a basically hopeful book about policymaking, although it ob-
viously is not the behavior of President Reagan's National Security
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Council that he uses to support his argument. While Kelman does
not dwell on such manifest failures, his message is more a counsel of
realism in the face of inevitable difficulties than a misty-eyed apolo-
gia for the status quo. Kelman's work is an attempt to rehabilitate
government both by pointing to the strengths of our system and by
taking a realistic view of its potential.
Since the book had its origins in Kelman's introductory courses
on the policy process at the Kennedy School of Government at
Harvard, part of it is high school civics with a graduate school twist.
People who have almost no knowledge of the institutional structure
of American government can read this book. Readers will come
away with a good introduction to the government's basic frame-
work: an introduction that is well-informed by current scholarship
on the workings of Congress, the executive branch, and the courts,
and enriched by comparisons with the institutional structures of
other Western democracies. The book charts a sensible middle
ground between criticism and appreciation of the policy process.
The Workings of the Policy Process:
Politics as Self-Interest and Public Spirit
The first half of the book outlines the workings of the policy pro-
cess. Kelman emphasizes the way political forces interact with insti-
tutional structures to affect both substantive policy results and
citizens' feelings of self-respect and dignity in their dealings with the
state.3 Kelman sees politics as pervasive in all branches of govern-
ment, including the judiciary, and argues that the widespread pres-
ence of political motivations is a desirable feature of government so
long as institutional constraints operate effectively. He rejects any
sharp division between political legislatures, political agencies, and
the courts. Kelman's broad-gauged view of politics includes both
"jousting among advocates" and deliberation. 4 Either element is
incomplete taken alone. Political life is partly a contest between
conflicting interests seeking to use the coercive power of the state
for their own benefit. It is, however, also an arena for discussion
where political learning occurs, minds can be changed, and politics
becomes "a common problem-solving venture." 5 In Kelman's view
3. Kelman at 16.
4. Kelman at 42-43.
5. Kelman at 43.
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the aim of reformers should be to design, in all branches of govern-
ment, institutions that encourage discussion and political learning.
6
In this light, Kelman reviews the policymaking process in Con-
gress, the Presidency, the bureaucracy, and the Supreme Court. His
analysis of Congress recognizes the importance of local constituen-
cies and campaign contributors in shaping legislators' positions.
Nonetheless, his work is in the spirit of some recent scholarship that
emphasizes the role of legislators' personal convictions in explain-
ing votes. 7 Such scholarship also emphasizes the impact of informa-
tion and ideas in producing successful lobbying campaigns in the
public interest.
8
Kelman views the President as an official with less actual power
than he is perceived to have. Yet the President is not completely
powerless in his dealings with Congress and the bureaucracy. His
main impact on Congress is in drafting legislative proposals for con-
gressional consideration. In spite of the growth in congressional
staff and the decline of party loyalty, Kelman still sees the Presi-
dent's agenda-setting role as important. The President's personal
impact on the bureaucracy is a function of the way he organizes
White House staff to oversee agencies and to generate legislative
proposals. Within the constraints imposed by statutory mandates
and by the sheer size of the executive branch, the President can still
influence the behavior of agencies. 9
In discussing the bureaucracy, Kelman emphasizes the political
nature of many of its choices, especially in the promulgation of ma-
jor rules. Congressional delegation of authority to an agency is
likely to affect the relative strength of outside advocates, since
"some interest groups will prefer to deal with the bureaucracy, but
others will prefer Congress."' 0 As in his discussion of Congress,
Kelman ends his institutional analyses of the President and the bu-
reaucracy with a recognition of the key role of "public spirit.""
Kelman believes that most such officials try to "do good," but he
also recognizes the dangers of this type of effort: a rigid, fanatical
president; a bureaucracy that subverts the congressional will.
6. Kelman at 43.
7. See, e.g., Kalt and Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Poli-
tics, 74 Am. Econ. Rev. 279 (1984); Levine, Revisionism Revised? Airline Deregulation
and the Public Interest, 74 Law & Contemp. Prob. 179 (1981).
8. See, e.g., D. Robyn, Braking the Special Interests: Trucking Deregulation and the
Politics of Policy Reform (1987).
9. Kelman at 100-102.
10. Kelman at 110.
11. Kelman at 83-87, 112-13.
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Finally, Kelman views the federal courts as the "political institu-
tion most explicitly designed to encourage those making decisions
to examine policies in the light of what is right rather than what is in
the personal interest of the decisionmaker."' 2 As shown by Robert
Bork's confirmation hearings, this position is a controversial one,
raising the question of how much substantive review courts should
provide. Kelman does not directly address this issue in any detail,
however, since his main concern is with the operation of the poli-
cymaking process in Congress and the bureaucracy.
Evaluating the Policy Process: Of Incentives and Values
Kelman's evaluation of the policy process is best understood in
the context of the changing field of public policy analysis in the
post-war period. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, economists de-
veloped techniques of project evaluation based on cost-benefit tests
and systems analysis, and many of those who made seminal contri-
butions to this development became active advocates for the appli-
cation of economic analysis to the policy process.' 3 These
techniques began to affect public decisionmaking with the appoint-
ment of Robert McNamara as Secretary of Defense in 1961. McNa-
mara peopled the Department with a group of self-styled "whiz
kids" committed to systems analysis and economic methods.' 4 Sev-
eral years later, the Johnson Administration followed the Defense
Department model in establishing offices for Policy, Planning, and
Budgeting in agencies with domestic programmatic responsibilities
such as Health, Education and Welfare, and Housing and Urban
Development.15
Eventually, however, the Vietnam War and domestic unrest
dampened the optimism of reform-minded students of the federal
spending process. The problems of those years were not amenable
to solution solely by technocrats. Furthermore, at the same time that
cost-benefit analysts were forced to recognize the limitations of their
techniques, other economists began to use their analytic tools to un-
dermine the legitimacy of existing regulatory policies. Their work
12. Kelman at 133.
13. R. McKean, Efficiency in Government Through Systems Analysis (1958); Mea-
suring Benefits of Government Investments (R. Dorfman ed. 1965); A. Maass, M.
Hufschmidt, R. Dorfman, H. Thomas, S. Marglin, & G. Fair, Design of Water-Resources
Systems (1962).
14. C. Hitch & R. McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age (1960).
15. For a selection of papers from Congressional hearings on the Policy, Planning
and Budget (PPB) process held in 1968 and 1969, see R. Haveman &J. Margolis, Public
Expenditures and Policy Analysis (1970).
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viewed legislation as the outcome of political dealmaking that fre-
quently did no more than preserve or enhance the monopoly power
of existing producers.' 6 One implication of this work was that gov-
ernment intervention in the economy should be prevented because
such intervention was usually no more than a device to benefit nar-
row, well-organized interests.
Research critical of the process by which legislation was produced
was complemented by research showing that many regulatory pro-
grams actually harmed consumers.1 7 Even research that accepted
the economic justifications for federal regulation in such areas as
environmental protection was critical of the forms such regulation
took and urged more reliance on economic incentives to produce
compliance.' 8 At the same time studies of government spending
programs tended to emphasize their weaknesses, showing, for ex-
ample, that most subsidized housing was built outside of central cit-
ies and that many who completed job training programs were
unable to find jobs.' 9 Although many scholars who criticized ex-
isting social welfare and spending programs were deeply committed
to the programs' purposes, others used the generally critical tone of
this work to show that government domestic spending and regula-
tory activity were too intrusive, too costly and in need of drastic cur-
tailment. These analysts and policymakers used arguments in favor
of deregulating airlines or trucking to advocate cutting back envi-
ronmental protection, and they used critiques of existing welfare
policies to argue for drastic reductions in government spending.
They interpreted studies showing that social programs had not ac-
complished all of their goals to imply that the goals themselves were
not worth pursuing.20
16. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 335
(1974); Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 3
(1971); Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19J. Law & Econ. 211
(1976).
17. See, e.g., The Crisis of the Regulatory Commissions (P. MacAvoy ed. 1970);
Moore, The Beneficiaries of Trucking Regulation, 21 J. Law & Econ. 327 (1978); and
Wilson, The Dead Hand of Regulation, The Public Interest, Fall 1971, at 39.
18. B. Ackerman, S. Rose-Ackerman, J. Sawyer & D. Henderson, The Uncertain
Search for Environmental Quality (1974); A. Kneese & C. Schultze, Pollution, Prices,
and Public Policy (1975); C. Schultze, The Public Use of the Private Interest (1977).
19. See, e.g., H. Aaron, Shelter and Subsidies: Who Benefits From Federal Housing
Policies (1972); R. Nelson, The Moon and the Ghetto (1977); G. Steiner, The State of
Welfare (1971).
20. See, e.g., M. Anderson, The Federal Bulldozer (1964); C. Murray, Losing Ground:
American Social Policy, 1950-80 (1984); E. Savas, Privatizing the Public Sector: How to
Shrink Government (1982). Arguments of these analysts were accepted by some offi-
cials within the Reagan Administration. For an explication and critical review of the
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Not surprisingly, liberal reform-minded public policy analysts
have not responded sympathetically to what they consider to be a
misuse of their work. In a counterattack emphasizing the real ac-
complishments of recent regulatory and social programs, 2' they
have pointed to the importance of information, ideas, and public
spiritedness in determining government policy. 22 Kelman's book,
basically optimistic in tone, falls in this category. His work is part of
the current reaction to seven years of Reaganite criticism of govern-
ment social policy, building upon Jimmy Carter's presidential cam-
paign "against" Washington. In this political climate, policy
analysts worry that if they are too critical of government policies,
politicians may decide not to reform programs but eliminate them
altogether. In the 1960s many policy analysts were insiders or, at
least, sympathetic outsiders who supported the contemporary sub-
stantive goals but were critical of existing means. In contrast, ana-
lysts who support current program goals fear that others will use
their criticism of means to cast doubt on the ends themselves: if the
government cannot accomplish its goals efficiently, it should change
those goals.
In keeping with his sympathetic view of public officials, Kelman
characterizes bureaucrats as officials who are called upon to make
highly political decisions and who need both outside information
and individual principles to perform their function competently.
Bureaucrats are constantly required to make decisions on the basis
of imperfect scientific, social, and economic information, and in the
face of vague congressional mandates. Their major decisions will be
reviewed by courts, congressional committees, and members of the
public, who may misunderstand the constraints under which they
operate. Kelman's understanding of the difficulties faced by the bu-
reaucracy is, however, colored by his understanding of the character
of the legislation that it is called upon to enforce. Kelman believes
that since the 1930s statutes have become less detailed and more
general. In his view "a good deal of the formal authority to make
controversial, and hence political, choices has left Congress and
gone to the bureaucracy."-23 This has happened, according to
Kelman, because time pressures on Congress have intensified, giv-
goals and philosophy of the Reagan policymakers in a variety of areas, see J. Palmer & I.
Sawhill, The Reagan Record (1984).
21. See, e.g., J. Schwarz, America's Hidden Success (1983); Challenge to Leadership
215 (. Sawhill ed. 1988).
22. Levine, supra note 7, at 179; D. Robyn, supra note 8.
23. Kelman at 56.
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ing its members no time to draft detailed statutes. But while no one
doubts that agency officials have considerable discretion, Kelman's
view of the trend toward highly general legislation is directly op-
posed to the view of other scholars that regulatory statutes-if not
all laws-are more detailed than in the past, give less leeway to bu-
reaucrats, and are less likely to use the independent agency form. 2
4
These authors have studied the Clean Air Act, a law that Kelman
recognizes as an exception. Nevertheless, it remains an open ques-
tion whether current statutes really are generally less detailed, espe-
cially in light of the greater role of Congress in initiating policy and
the number of years in which Congress and the White House have
been of different political parties. One might argue not only that
statues generally are more specific than heretofore, but also that the
greater specificity of statutes has made bureaucrats' tasks harder,
not easier. Even statutes thought to be quite detailed have plenty of
ambiguous language for bureaucrats to interpret and are likely to
include deadlines and specific directives that make rational priority
setting difficult. Under the Clean Air Act, for example, public offi-
cials have hardly been reduced to technocratic automatons face-
lessly enforcing congressional directives.
The problem of motivating people to high quality performance
remains, as Kelman argues, the central problem of public adminis-
tration. In fact, given the complexity of the issues dealt with in
many recent regulatory statutes, the need for committed public ser-
vants may be even greater than under more general statutes that
dealt with simpler problems.
Kelman's response to the task of improving bureaucratic behavior
is to advocate blending selective incentives such as bonuses, promo-
tions, and performance-based merit pay with the development of
public-spirited attitudes. He criticizes economic models of political
and bureaucratic processes as caricatures of human behavior which
ignore the possibility that commitment to the public good is a major
motivating force. Yet he does recognize that individualized incen-
tives, be they money or power, are important for public officials, and
he understands that even ideologues want to be reelected.
So long as political-economic thinkers do not claim that narrow
self-interest is the only desirable motivation, these scholars, whom
Kelman criticizes, provide a useful antidote to those who identify
government actions solely with the furtherance of the "public
24. B. Ackerman and W. Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air (1981); S. Melnick, Regula-
tion and the Courts: The Case of the Clean Air Act (1983).
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good." While these scholars, whose operating assumption is self-
interested maximizing behavior, have sometimes gone too far in
identifying their theory both with what is and what ought to be,
2 5
such overenthusiasm should not blind us to the very real contribu-
tions they have made. Kelman would temper the extreme claims of
some public choice analysts with the empirical observation that
many government officials care deeply about the policies they seek
to implement. While this claim is undoubtedly true, it does not
mean either that self-interest is unimportant or that public spirit
necessarily produces high quality performance.
While I share Kelman's belief that organizations perform better
with an atmosphere of personal trust and mutual respect and with
subordinates who believe in the goals of the organization, I perceive
considerable risk for a democracy that seeks in a self-conscious way
to develop "public spirit" in its people. Teaching people the values
of respect for others' points of view, of mutual accommodation to
divergent convictions, and of the necessity of dialogue and open dis-
cussion is an important precondition for a liberal democratic (lower
case 1, lower case d) state. However, peopling government offices
with ideologues who hold strong views on substantive policy that
may diverge from those of the President and Congress can create
problems exemplified by the behavior of Oliver North. While Kel-
man makes a passing reference to the risk of fanatical presidents, he
does not, to my mind, place enough emphasis on the dangers of
strong commitments in general. Furthermore, state-sponsored in-
doctrination along the lines of Nazi Germany or Khomeni's Iran has
the obvious danger of suppressing independent thought and op-
pressing divergent opinions. Clearly, Kelman is not recommending
going to that extreme, but his book invites this criticism because he
does not specify what kind of "public spirit" he has in mind or how
it should be generated.
Perhaps in conjuring up Oliver North I have been unfair to Pro-
fessor Kelman. He has, after all, done no more than echo a com-
mon complaint about the suppression of initiative in rigid
rulebound systems. But the Iran-Contra Affair should give us all
pause, even those concerned with policies-such as health and
safety regulation and aid to the poor-that do not require security
25. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution,
49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263 (1982); Easterbrook, Foreward: The Court and the Economic
System, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1984).
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clearances. Basic bureaucratic practices that produce consultation
and accountability begin to seem worth preserving. A government
of ideologues committed to their own view of the public welfare can
be a threat to the very basis of liberal democratic government.
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